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MEDICAID SPEND DOWN, ESTATE 
RECOVERY AND DIVORCE: 
DOCTRINE, PLANNING AND POLICY 
John A. Miller 
 Medicaid is the need-based government program that pays for much of 
the health care for the poor in the United States.  Medicaid often ends up 
paying the costs of nursing home care for middle-class seniors who have 
descended into poverty as a result of the high costs of such care.  For married 
couples, Medicaid requires a “spend down” of both spouses’ assets before one 
spouse can qualify for Medicaid support.  This Article posits that, unless the 
law is changed, divorce may well become standard Medicaid planning 
practice in many circumstances.  This will be especially true for middle and 
upper-middle-class married couples because they have the most to gain from 
divorce in this context.  This Article argues that Medicaid’s approach toward 
married couples is based on a narrow and outmoded image of marriage.  It 
assumes a marriage where the spouses have enjoyed a long life together, have 
common intended beneficiaries, have no other person to whom they have an 
equal or greater commitment, and it assumes a high level of commitment to 
the institution of marriage itself.  This view of marriage tends to not fit the 
modern landscape where the marriage one inhabits in old age may be of newer 
vintage and may not include children of the marriage.  Added to this is the  
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trend toward the “de-institutionalization” of marriage.  The article contends 
that as marriage becomes less sacred in our society, the utility of divorce as a 
Medicaid planning strategy will outweigh its moral repugnance.  This is 
especially true because in this context, divorce does not require ending or 
even substantially changing the day-to-day relationship of the parties.  It 
simply becomes a rational asset protection plan.  
 The alternative recommended to this developing trend is the 
disaggregation of marital property for most Medicaid purposes.  Thus, 
instead of requiring the healthy spouse to spend down her or his assets before 
the unhealthy spouse can qualify for Medicaid assistance as the present law 
does, the Article recommends that only the assets properly allocable under 
state law to the unhealthy spouse should be required to be spent down.  
Similarly, estate recovery should only apply to the assets properly allocable to 
the deceased person who received the Medicaid assistance during life.  This 
last point is particularly important in light of the apparent trend toward 
more aggressive estate recovery in some states. 
I. Introduction 
In the United States, much of the cost for long-
term disability care is borne by the state and federal governments 
through the Medicaid program.1  These costs are enormous because of 
the millions of people who need such care and because of the high in-
dividual costs involved.2  In fiscal year 2012, Medicaid expenditures 
for long-term care exceeded 120 billion dollars.3  For 2014, it was esti-
                                                                                                                                
 1. Medicaid paid for nearly half of all nursing home care in 2008.  See RALPH 
C. BRASHIER, MASTERING ELDER LAW 345 (Carolina Academic Press 2010).  This is 
because for most people, a period of extended disability leads to impoverishment.  
A companion program, Medicare, provides nearly universal acute care health in-
surance for those sixty-five and older, but it does not cover custodial care such as 
the care one might receive in a nursing home.  For a useful summary of Medicare 
and its limits see id. at Ch. 8.  The costs of long-term health care represent one of 
the biggest financial risks of old age. See John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment 
to Obtain Government Benefits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  81, 88 (2003).  Long-
term care insurance is available to those who are healthy and wealthy enough to 
qualify and pay for it.  However, its widespread use seems unlikely.  Id. at 90 n.67.    
 2. In 2012, over eight million persons were receiving long-term care services 
in the United States. About two million of those people were in nursing homes or 
residential care communities. LAUREN HARRIS-KOJETIN, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 
OVERVIEW 38 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nsltcp/long_ 
term_care_services_2013.pdf (estimating of the total annual costs of long-term care 
in the United States to range from $200 to $300 billion). 
 3. Distribution of Medicaid Spending by Serving, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (2012), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/distribution-of-medicaid 
-spending-by-service/. 
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mated that the average annual base cost of a nursing home stay in a 
semi-private room in the United States was about eighty thousand 
dollars.4 
Medicaid is need-based and, thus, usually requires spend down 
by the disabled person and his or her spouse before it can be ac-
cessed.5  In addition, though it exempts certain assets, most important-
ly the home, from being counted in determining need, federal law re-
quires the states to recover Medicaid outlays from the “estate” of a 
deceased Medicaid recipient under certain circumstances.6  Though 
the primary asset to which this “estate recovery” typically applies is 
the recipient’s home, estate recovery can range much more broadly.7  
In some states, estate recovery can even apply to the estate of the 
Medicaid recipient’s spouse.8  In essence, Medicaid is designed to as-
sure that it will bear the long-term care costs of a married person in a 
manner that is thoroughly impoverishing to both spouses. 
Planners have found many ways to ameliorate some of the hard-
er edges of Medicaid. In an earlier article, two co-authors and I de-
scribed the Medicaid planning process in detail.9  Now, this Article 
turns its attention to barriers to Medicaid planning presented by the 
Medicaid spend down requirements and the estate recovery rules. 
Most particularly, it illustrates the planning problems, opportunities, 
strategies, and hazards associated with those rules in the context of 
marriage.10  It is my thesis that the overall direction of the Medicaid 
                                                                                                                                
 4. GENWORTH FINANCIAL, GENWORTH 2014 COST OF CARE SURVEY: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014), available at https://www.genworth.com/dam/ 
Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/131168-032514-Executive-Summary-
nonsecure.pdf. 
 5. Medicaid, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/help-paying-costs/medicaid/medicaid.html (last visited March 10, 2015). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2012). 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. See infra Part III.C. 
 9. Sean R. Bleck et al., Preserving Wealth and Inheritance Through Medicaid 
Planning for Long-term Care, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 153, 153–96 (2013) [herein-
after Bleck et al.].  One technique we did not address is what is known as “spousal 
refusal”.  For a useful treatment of this technique see Andrew W. Wone, Note, 
Don’t Want to Pay for Your Institutionalized Spouse? The Role of Spousal Refusal and 
Medicaid in funding Long-Term Care, 14 ELDER L.J. 485 (2006).  
 10. For an excellent broader treatment of disability planning see Ralph J. 
Moore & Ron. M. Landsman, Planning for Disability, in TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS 816 
(2d ed., 2000).  Commerce Clearing House publishes a six-volume loose-leaf ser-
vice called the MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE.  See MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
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system is toward encouraging divorce where one spouse needs Medi-
Medicaid assistance and the other does not. 
Elder law attorneys have understood for some time that divorce 
can be an effective Medicaid planning tool.11  But, in the past,12 married 
couples have been reluctant to take that path and other strategies were 
available.  As a new generation, the baby boomers, enters old age and 
as states become more aggressive in their approaches to estate 
recovery, I think this will change.  Divorce will be an especially 
important Medicaid and estate recovery planning technique in those 
states that employ estate recovery against the estate of the 
independent spouse to pay for costs incurred on behalf of the 
Medicaid recipient spouse.13 
This Article posits that, unless the law is changed, divorce may 
well become standard Medicaid planning practice in many 
circumstances.  This will be especially true for middle-and upper-
middle class married couples because they have the most to gain from 
divorce in this context.  Part of the reason for this is that Medicaid’s 
approach toward married couples is based on a narrow and 
outmoded image of marriage.14  It assumes a marriage where the 
                                                                                                                                
GUIDE (Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1969-1972).  Other valuable loose leaf re-
sources are JOHN J. REGAN, ET AL., TAX, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE 
ELDERLY (Matthew Bender 2014) (there is an accompanying forms book); THOMAS 
D. BEGLEY, JR. & JO-ANNE HERINA JEFFREYS,  REPRESENTING THE ELDERLY CLIENT: 
LAW AND PRACTICE (Wolters Kluwer 2015); A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON ET AL., 
ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT (West 2010); ROBERT B. FLEMING & LISA 
NACHMIAS, ELDER LAW ANSWER BOOK (Wolters Kluwer 2014); JERRY A. HYMAN, 
ELDER LAW AND FINANCIAL STRATEGIES: PLANNING FOR LATER LIFE (Law Journal 
Press 2015).  In this article I rely heavily on BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra, to address 
matters that are typically established by state law.  Medicaid is a remarkable mo-
saic of state and federal law, and that makes writing about it from a national per-
spective especially challenging. 
 11. See, e.g., Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Love May Be Less Wonderful The Second Time 
Around (Medicaid Considerations When Well-to-do, Healthy Clients Remarry and their 
Late-in-Life Companions are less Well-to-Do), 13 NAELA Q. 11 (2000); Michael Wyty-
chak III, Payment of Nursing Home Bills Through the Medicaid Program, 36 IDAHO L 
REV. 243 (2000); Michael Farley, Note, When “I Do” Becomes “I Don’t”: Eliminating 
the Divorce Loophole to Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER L.J. 27 (2001). 
 12. Greta Weber, Till Debt Do Us Part, MILWAUKEE MAG. (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.milwaukeemag.com/2014/08/26/tilldebtdouspart/. 
 13. Id.; Craig Reaves, Paying for the ‘Institutionalized Spouse, N.Y. TIMES (June 
4, 2010), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/047/paying-for-the-
institiutionalized-spouse/. 
 14. See Farley, supra note 11. 
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spouses have enjoyed a long life together, have common intended 
beneficiaries, have no other person to whom they have an equal or 
greater commitment, and it assumes a high level of commitment to 
the institution of marriage itself.15  This view of marriage tends to not 
fit the modern landscape where the marriage one inhabits in old age 
may be of newer vintage and may not include children of the 
marriage.  Added to this is the trend toward “de-institutionalization” 
of marriage described in some detail by Professor Anne Alstott in a 
recent article in The Tax Law Review.16  In her view, “[m]ore than ever 
before, Americans see marriage as one of many options for personal 
growth and fulfillment, and they form and exit marriages along with 
other relationships as a normal part of the life course.” 17  I suggest that 
as marriage becomes less sacred in our society, the utility of divorce as 
a Medicaid planning strategy will outweigh its moral repugnance.  
This is especially true because in this context divorce does not require 
ending or even substantially changing the day-to-day relationship of 
the parties.  It simply becomes a rational asset protection plan.  The 
great irony of this state of affairs is that the persons who could derive 
the most financial benefit from divorce, the upper-middle class, are 
among the class of persons who heretofore have been the most likely 
to marry and stay married.18  In a sense, Medicaid has laid siege to the 
last bastion of marriage as a life-long institution. 
The alternative I recommend to this developing trend is the 
disaggregation of marital property for most Medicaid purposes.  
Thus, instead of requiring the healthy spouse to spend down his or 
her assets before the unhealthy spouse can qualify for Medicaid 
assistance as present law requires, I recommend that only the assets 
properly allocable under state law to the unhealthy spouse should be 
required to be spent down.  Similarly, estate recovery should only 
apply to the property interests allocable to the deceased person who 
received the Medicaid assistance during life.  This last point is 
particularly important in light of the apparent trend toward more 
aggressive estate recovery in some states.19 
                                                                                                                                
 15. Id. 
 16. Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and 
Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 697 (2013). 
 17. Id. at 697. 
 18. Id. at 699.  
 19. Medicaid Estate Recovery, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2005), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/estaterec.htm. 
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In what follows, this Article begins by explaining the present 
structure of Medicaid law and especially develops the rules 
concerning spend down and estate recovery.  Then, it describes the 
various planning strategies that have emerged in response to those 
rules.  It concludes that part by illustrating the ways in which divorce 
may effectively avoid both spend down and estate recovery. In the 
final sections, it briefly describes the policy concerns raised by the 
estate recovery activities of the states and makes the case for 
disaggregation of marital property for most purposes. 
Most of what is found in this Article has application throughout 
the United States.  Even so, it is important for the reader to keep in 
mind that every state Medicaid program has its unique features and 
rules.  Some of the more prominent differences between states are 
addressed here, especially the differences that arise between 
community property and common law states. 
II. An Overview of Medicaid and Its Eligibility Rules 
Medicaid is a state and federally funded medical assistance 
program for certain people, including the elderly and disabled, who 
have income and assets below specified standards.20  It provides 
comprehensive medical coverage for persons in the federal welfare 
categories (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and 
Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled) and 
for various additional classes of persons including those requiring 
long-term care.21  As noted above, Medicaid is a significant cost to 
federal and state governments alike, and they restrict access to its 
support.22  Medicaid planning, consequently, often requires the 
                                                                                                                                
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).  As discussed in the text, Medicaid is struc-
tured to be implemented on a state-by-state basis.  In Washington, for example, 
Medicaid is administered by the Health and Recovery Services Administration 
(“HRSA”) of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services 
(“DSHS”). Washington Apple Health (Medicaid), WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., 
http://hrsa.dshs.wa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (outlining updated infor-
mation related to eligibility standards). 
 21. Medical Programs, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS. http:// 
www.dshs.wa.gov/esa/community-services-offices/medical-programs (last visit-
ed March 18, 2015). 
 22. See BRASHIER, supra note 1; Congressional policy is to resist Medicaid 
planning and to make concerted efforts to restrict access to Medicaid.  This policy 
was expressed most recently by the Deficit Reduction Act of 200522 (often referred 
to as the “DRA”).  The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, 120 Stat. 
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assistance of attorneys and others with special expertise in the gov-
government benefits field.23 
As Bleck, Isenhour, & Miller state, “Medicaid planning may be 
defined as the process of effectively accessing government resources 
to pay for long-term health care of a disabled person in the manner 
that is least financially disruptive to the wellbeing of the person’s 
spouse and family.”24  As already noted, the government resources 
come from Medicaid.25  Estate recovery planning may be described as 
the end game of Medicaid planning. 
At the federal level, Medicaid is administered by the Center for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”) which is part of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).26  In each state, 
Medicaid is administered by the cabinet-level agency charged with 
oversight of public health.27  Each of those agencies promulgates rules 
and regulations to implement Medicaid within its state’s borders.28 
A. The Basics: Eligibility and Benefits 
The state Medicaid agency makes two determinations.29  First, 
whether the applicant needs long-term care and, second, whether the 
applicant meets the financial eligibility criteria.30  The determination 
for long-term care requires one to need substantial assistance with two 
or more of the following activities of daily living (ADLs): eating, 
bathing, toileting, ambulation, transfer, positioning, and medication 
management.31 
                                                                                                                                
4 was signed into law on February 8, 2006.  This legislation made major changes in 
the rules governing eligibility for Medicaid long-term care coverage that tightened 
up what is known as the “spend down” process.  Id. 
 23. Typically one seeking assistance in this area might look to Legal Aid At-
torneys and/or attorneys who are designated Certified Elder Law Attorneys 
(CELAs) by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA). 
 24. Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 155. See also Miller, supra note 1, at 91–92. 
 25. Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 158. 
 26. 42 C.F.R. § 430 (2015).  
 27. See State Medicaid & CHIP Profiles, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid. 
gov/medicaid-Chip-Program-Information/By-State/By-State.html. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, WASH. ST. 
DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS. 1, 5 (2012), available at http://www.dshs.wa. 
gov/sites/default/files/ALTSA/hcs/documents/22-619.pdf.   
 30. Id. 
 31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-335-015 (44)(e) (2012). 
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As discussed in more detail below, financial eligibility involves 
meeting both asset and income tests.32  There are special rules for 
married couples for each of these tests.33  For persons eligible for 
nursing home coverage, Medicaid requires that all income, after the 
special allocations described below, be paid to the nursing home.34  
The amount that the Medicaid recipient pays to the nursing home 
each month is called “participation.”35  Medicaid will then pay the 
nursing home the difference between the recipient’s participation and 
the Medicaid reimbursement rate for the facility.36  A typical Medicaid 
reimbursement rate is $1,080 per month.37  When a person qualifies for 
nursing home coverage, Medicaid also provides coverage for most 
medical expenses, such as prescriptions and physician bills.38 
Some states have Medicaid programs that are designed to help 
persons avoid institutionalization.39  These will cover long-term care 
delivered at home, in adult family homes, and in assisted-living 
facilities.40  States are required to cover benefits for some assisted-
living facilities, but coverage of most home and community-based 
long-term care services is optional.41  The result is a “historical 
structural bias toward institutional care.”42 
  
                                                                                                                                
 32. See infra Part II.A. 1 & 2. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 4.  
 34. Pub. 17, Transmittal No. 97–2, Dec. 10, 1997. 
 35. See also MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, supra 
note 29, at 9. 
 36. The Medicaid reimbursement rate is based on the facility’s costs to pro-
vide care and the level of need of the residents and varies with each facility, but is 
always less than the private pay rate. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)(1)(iii) (2012); see also 
MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR ADULTS, supra note 29 at 6.  
 37. Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY2010, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (2010), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-payments-per-
enrollee/. 
 38. FERD MITCHELL & CHERYL MITCHELL, LEGAL PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS OF 
U.S. NATIONAL HEALTH CARE PLAN § 3:12 (2014).  
 39. Erica Reaves & MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid and Long-Term Services and 
Supports: A Primer, Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (July 30, 2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-and-
long-term-services-and-supports-a-primer/. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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1. INCOME
43 
The federal government has established statutory income 
requirements for an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid.44  In thirty-
nine states, eligibility for Medicaid is automatic when an individual 
qualifies for Social Security disability benefits.45  The remaining states 
use more restrictive requirements than Social Security disability to 
determine Medicaid eligibility.46  For individuals applying for an 
institutional level of care, some states have an income cap.47  In other 
states, if an applicant’s income is above the Medicaid rate and below 
the private pay rate, the applicant will be certified as eligible for 
Medicaid and will only have to pay the Medicaid rate; in that case, 
however, the applicant must spend down the excess income over the 
Medicaid rate on medical costs before he or she will be eligible for 
Medicaid coverage for other medical expenses.48 
2. RESOURCES
49 
An unmarried recipient of Medicaid cannot have more than 
$2,000 in non-exempt resources.50  Resources are valued according to 
the fair market value of the applicant’s equity interest in the 
resource.51  Joint bank accounts are presumed to be owned entirely by 
the applicant unless the applicant establishes a different ownership 
distribution.52  Assets owned jointly by spouses are presumed to be 
owned proportionately, unless a different ownership allocation can be 
                                                                                                                                
 43. BEGLEY  & JEFFREYS, supra note 10; see Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http:// 
www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Eligibility/Eligibility.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 44. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.120, 435.121 (2014); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.03.  
 45. 42 C.F.R. § 435.120; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.03[A].  
 46. 42 C.F.R. § 435.121; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.03[B]. 
 47. The cap in 2014 is 300% of the Federal SSI benefit rate, $2,163 per month.  
Eligibility, supra note 43; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §7.04[A]; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(cc)(1)(C)(ii)(I) (2012). 
 48. 42 C.F.R. § 435.4; see BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.04[B]. 
 49. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (2014); see also BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, 
at § 7.05[F][1]. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B) (2013); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205; see BEGLEY & 
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][1][a].  
 51. 20 C.F.R. 416.1201(b)–(c); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.05[F][1][a]. 
 52. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1208(c); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.05[F][1][a][i].  
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established.53  However, title has little significance in the marital con-
context since, with certain exceptions described below, all assets of the 
couple are required to be spent down in order to obtain eligibility for 
either spouse.54  This can be a vital disadvantage to marriage. 
3. EXEMPT RESOURCES
55 
Some resources are deemed “exempt” resources when 
determining whether a Medicaid applicant meets resource ceiling of 
$2,000.56  The applicant’s home (including a mobile home or a 
condominium) is exempt if the applicant or the applicant’s spouse is 
residing in the home or the applicant (or his or her representative) 
states that he or she intends to return home.57  Under the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, states must impose a limit on exempt home 
equity ranging from $500,000 to $750,000.58  The home equity limit 
does not apply if the home is occupied by a spouse or by a disabled 
child, blind child, or child under twenty-one.59  This limit also does not 
apply to the value of home equity owned by the spouse of an 
applicant.60  A home includes all contiguous property, even if this 
includes several lots, legal descriptions or tax parcels, and includes 
related “out-buildings” on the property.61  Proceeds from the sale of a 
home are exempt if used within three months of receipt of the 
proceeds to purchase another home.62 
Rent from the home is income to the recipient, which generally 
                                                                                                                                
 53. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1208(c). 
 54. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][1][a]. 
 55. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210; see also BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.05[F][1][b]. 
 56. Financial Requirements–Assets, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
(2015), http://longtermcare.gov/medicare-medicaid-more/medicaid/medicaid-
eligibility/financial-requirements-assets/. 
 57. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210, 416.1216.  
 58. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–171, Title VI, Chap. 2, Subchap. 
A, § 6014, 120 Stat. 65 (enacted Feb. 8, 2006), available at  http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ171/pdf/PLAW-109publ171.pdf [hereinafter DRA 
2005]; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(1) (2012). There was no value limit on the home for ap-
plications prior to this date.  Federal law now allows the states to exclude no less 
than $500,000 and no more than $750,000 of equity.  Id.  See Michael Gilfix, Plan-
ning for the Home Under Tougher Medicaid Rules, 35 Est. Plan. 27, 29 (2008). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(2). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(a) (2014). 
 62. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(e)–(f).  
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must be paid toward the cost of care.63  However, certain expenses 
such as interest (but not principal) on home mortgage debt, taxes, 
insurance, and maintenance expenses for the home can be offset in 
calculating countable income from rent.64  It is not uncommon for 
family members of a Medicaid recipient to reside in the home rent-
free, and this use is generally ignored by state Medicaid authorities.65 
As explained in the discussion of Medicaid estate recovery 
below, Medicaid will usually have a claim against the Medicaid 
recipient’s interest in an exempt home at the time of death of the 
Medicaid recipient for most costs paid by Medicaid after the recipient 
turned fifty-five.66  Exempt items other than the home may include a 
vehicle, household furnishings, personal effects, burial plots, certain 
burial funds, small life insurance policies, and certain annuities.67  
With respect to annuities, however, the payments are counted as 
income for Medicaid participation purposes.68 
4. ADDITIONAL RULES FOR MARRIED COUPLES 
Medicaid has a number of rules that in theory are designed to 
protect the income and assets of one spouse, often called the 
“community spouse,” when the other spouse qualifies for Medicaid.69  
Nominally speaking, these rules are designed to avoid the 
“impoverishment” of the community spouse.  The income rules are 
reasonably generous, but the resource rules are not.70 
The federal Medicaid statute expressly preempts state 
community property law for purposes of determining the ownership 
of income and assets.71  Medicaid determines ownership according to 
                                                                                                                                
 63. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212.  
 64. Id.   
 65. See Buying a House for a Special Needs Beneficiary: Proceed with Care!, 
SPECIAL NEEDS ALLIANCE (May 2011), http://www.specialneedsalliance.org/the-
voice/buying-a-house-for-a-special-needs-beneficiary-proceed-with-care-2/. 
 66. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.02[C], 9.04. 
 67. Michael Wytychack III, Payment of Nursing Home Bills Through the Medicaid 
Program, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 243, 249 (2000). 
 68. Id. 
 69. HFCA Transmittal 64 § 3528.11. 
 70. These Medicaid eligibility rules for a married couple apply only when one 
spouse is in the nursing home.  If both spouses are in a nursing home, they will be 
treated as though they were single and the Medicaid income and resource rules 
for single persons, discussed above, will apply for each. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(b)(2) (2012). 
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the name in which income is received.72  This is sometimes called the 
“name on the check” rule.73  With respect to resources, Medicaid 
nominally accords importance to the titling of an asset.74  However, 
the asset spend down rules apply without regard to title in most 
instances.75 
     a.   Income Eligibility76 
For one spouse of a married couple to receive Medicaid coverage 
for nursing home care, some states require that the income of that 
spouse must be less than the facility’s private pay rate plus his or her 
regularly recurring monthly medical expenses.77  Other states have an 
income cap for the Medicaid applicant of 300% of the federal SSI rate.78  
The income of the nursing home spouse (called the “institutional” 
spouse) is determined by first seeing what income comes in the name 
of that spouse.79  If this amount exceeds the eligibility standard, the 
person, under certain circumstances, may still be eligible if one-half of 
the income of both spouses is less than the eligibility standard.80 
     b.   Resource Eligibility 
All resources of both spouses are considered in determining eli-
eligibility, regardless of which spouse owns what resource or whether 
the property is considered to be separate or community property.81 
Prenuptial and Separate Property Agreements are disregarded.82  
Transfers between spouses before application have no effect on this 
                                                                                                                                
 72. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SPOUSES OF MEDICAID LONG-TERM 
CARE RECIPIENTS 5 (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ 
spouses.pdf. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(b), (d), §182-513-1395 (2012); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100 
(2014). 
 77. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][2][a]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(2); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.05[F][4][a]. This is aptly called the “Name on the Check” rule.  
 80. Id.   
 81. See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(c)(2), (f). 
 82. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 9(b) (2012); The Elder Law Approach 
to Estate Planning, SH059 ALI-ABA 375, 388 (2003); See Elder Law and Estate Plan-
ning, SH092 ALI-ABA 509, 530 (2003).  
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initial eligibility determination.83 
Because the resources test for Medicaid eligibility lumps all of 
the assets of a married couple together, assets owned solely by the 
community spouse may have to be spent down in order for the insti-
institutional spouse to qualify.84  In order for the institutional spouse 
entering a nursing home to qualify for Medicaid nursing home 
coverage, the married couple’s combined non-exempt resources must 
be less than an inflation-adjusted specified amount.85  This inflation-
adjusted specified amount is called the Community Spouse Resource 
Allowance (CSRA).86  In 2015, the maximum CSRA is $119,220.87  Any 
of the couple’s combined non-exempt assets in excess of the maximum 
CSRA plus $2,000 must be spent down before Medicaid eligibility is 
obtained for the institutional spouse.88 
5. TRANSFER OF ASSETS RULES 
Medicaid’s transfer of asset rules delay eligibility for nursing 
home coverage for a period of time.89  This is called the transfer penal-
penalty.90  The purpose of the penalty is to deter transferors from 
voluntarily impoverishing themselves in order to qualify for Medicaid 
coverage for their long-term care costs.91  The typical example of such 
a transfer is a large gift of cash or property to the transferor’s child.92  
                                                                                                                                
 83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(1). 
 84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(f), (c); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.05[F][4][d]. 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f). The 2015 minimum spousal resource allowance is 
$23,844.  See 2015 SSI and Spousal Impoverishment Standards, MEDICAID.GOV (Jan. 1, 
2015), http://medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/by-topics/ 
eligibility/downloads/2015-ssi-and-spousal-impoverishment-standards.pdf 
[hereinafter Spousal Impoverishment Standards]- 
 86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(2). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(2); see Spousal Impoverishment Standards, supra note 
85. 
 88. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(c), (f); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10 at 
§ 7.05[F][4][d]. 
 89. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 132 (West Academic Publishing, 6th ed. 2014). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A).  
 91. Gratuitous transfers are the primary target of these rules but some trans-
fers for value are also subject to them.  See Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 174. 
 92. See Bernard A. Krooks, How Gifts Can Affect Medicaid Eligibility, FORBES 
(Dec. 17, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardkrooks/2012/ 
12/17/how-gifts-can-affect-medicaid-eligibility/ (discussing Medicaid’s “look 
back” and “transfer penalty” rules). 
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There is no transfer penalty for transfers to a spouse because such 
transfers generally do not avoid spend down.93 
Only transfers within a certain period of time before application 
is made, called the “look-back period,” are subject to the transfer 
penalty.94  The look-back period is sixty months for all transfers made 
on or after February 8, 2006.95  Transfers not within the look-back 
period have no effect on Medicaid eligibility.96  Thus, for example, if a 
person gives away one million dollars six years before applying for 
Medicaid, that gift will not be considered in determining eligibility.  A 
typical way to calculate the transfer penalty is to “divid[e] the fair 
market value of the transferred asset by the statewide monthly 
average lowest semiprivate room rate for Medicaid certified nursing 
facilities calculated annually.”97  The result of this division, rounded 
down to the next whole number, will result in the number of days of 
ineligibility caused by the gifts given in that month.98  The penalty is 
imposed on the day of the transfer or the month following the day of 
transfer.99 
There are a number of transfers that are exceptions to the 
Medicaid asset transfer rules and do not cause the imposition of a 
period of ineligibility.  These include gifts not within the sixty month 
“look-back period,” transfer of the home to a child of the applicant 
who has lived in the home, and provided care to the applicant (which 
was necessary for the applicant to remain independent) for the two 
year period immediately prior to institutionalization.100  Transfer of the 
home to a sibling of the applicant who has an equity interest in the 
home and who has lived in the home for the one-year period immedi-
ately prior to institutionalization and a transfer of the home to a child 
                                                                                                                                
 93. See id.  
 94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2012).  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. This is the number for applications submitted on or after October 1, 2010, 
and it will be adjusted each October. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.06[G][1].  
 98. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. TRANSMITTAL 64 § 3258.4E; BEGLEY & 
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.06[G][1]. 
 99. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. Transmittal 64 § 3258.5A; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, 
supra note 10, at § 7.06[G][1]. 
 100. See Medicaid Treatment of the Home: Determining Eligibility and Repayment 
for Long-Term Care, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES (Apr. 2005), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/hometreat.htm. 
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under age twenty-one.101 
6. POST-ELIGIBILITY RULES 
Generally, a person in a nursing facility who has been deter-
mined eligible for Medicaid must pay virtually all of his or her income 
to the facility for the cost of his or her care.102  The community spouse 
can keep all checks paid in his or her name, regardless of amount and 
regardless of whether the income may be characterized as community 
income.103  Income includes wages, pensions, social security, VA or 
military payments, interest or dividends, and annuities.104 
If the income in the name of the community spouse is less than 
an inflation adjusted amount ($1,938.75 in 2014) the community 
spouse can keep enough of the nursing home spouse’s income to 
bring the community spouse’s income up to that amount.105  This is re-
ferred to as the spousal Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Al-
lowance (MMMNA).106 
Generally, money or property received by a Medicaid nursing 
home resident, will be deemed income in the month received.107  States 
take different approaches to setting income caps on Medicaid eligibil-
ity.  But if a Medicaid recipient’s income exceeds the state-determined 
cap then the income will cause ineligibility.108  To the extent the in-
come is not spent and causes the resident’s non-exempt resources to 
exceed $2,000 as of the first moment of the next month, the excess re-
sources may cause ineligibility (or require a resource spend-down).109  
                                                                                                                                
 101. See id. 
 102. See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(d) (2012). 
 103. See 42 U.S.C. §1396r-5(d). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN RESOURCES, SPOUSES OF MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE RECIPIENTS (2005), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/spouses.htm.  
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (2010); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at 
§ 7.05[F][2][b]. 
 105. See MEDICAID, SSI AND SPOUSAL IMPOVERISHMENT STANDARDS, 
MEDICAID.GOV (2014), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Eligibility/Downloads/Spousal-Impoverish 
ment-2014.pdf. 
 106. See Tools & Calculators, ELDER LAW ANSWERS, http://www.elderlaw 
answers.com/tool-andcalculators (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c) (2014); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201, 416.1207 (2014); BEGLEY & 
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][1][c]. 
 108. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[2][a]. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205. 
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Disclaimer cannot avoid this outcome.110 
In most states, cash received from the sale of an exempt or non-
exempt resource other than the home is not income in the month re-
ceived, but is a countable resource if it is held as of the first of the next 
month.111  The proceeds from the sale of a home remain exempt pro-
vided they are reinvested in another home “within three months of 
receipt.”112  The proceeds from the sale of other exempt resources are 
counted as available resources unless reinvested in another exempt 
resource.113  While not required, transferring title of exempt resources 
solely into the name of the community spouse can avoid ineligibility 
in some states for the nursing home spouse in the event the resources 
are sold, as well as protect the assets from Medicaid estate recovery.114  
While this result is sensible, it is not required of the states.  It may be 
that, in time, more and more states will act to close this planning op-
portunity. 
With respect to the community spouse, there is a one-time only 
“snapshot” of community resources: at the time of initial eligibility.115 
Unless the nursing home spouse is deinstitutionalized, or becomes in-
eligible for Medicaid, increases or changes of the form of wealth of the 
community spouse—and, in many states, even uncompensated trans-
fers by the community spouse—are disregarded.116 
III. Medicaid Estate Recovery 
Since 1993, Federal law has required that the states seek to recov-
er Medicaid outlays from the “estate” of the recipient under certain 
circumstances.117  The primary asset to which this estate recovery rule 
                                                                                                                                
 110. See generally, Cynthia L. Barrett, Disclaimer and Elective Share in the Medi-
caid Context, 1 MARQUETTE’S ELDER ADVISOR 40 (2000); See also LAWRENCE A. 
FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER  LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 263, 
317–21 (4th Ed. 2007). 
 111. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.05[F][6]. 
 112. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212. 
 113. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., FAMILIES FIRST ONLINE POLICY MANUAL § 17.2, 
available at http://www.tennessee.gov/humanserv/adfam/ff_olm/17.2%20 
Resources-Countable-NonCountable%20Resources.htm. 
 114. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1242; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A) (2014); see BEGLEY & 
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 8.05[B][1][a] note 52, 8.05[B][2]. 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c). 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). 
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applies is the home,118 but as discussed below, its application can 
range much more broadly.  Also, as discussed below, there are strate-
gies for avoiding estate recovery.  It is in states that are most aggres-
sive in pursuing estate recovery that divorce may become the para-
mount strategy.  Before delving into this area, it is necessary to 
appreciate the basic rules. 
A. The General Rule 
The State has a right to recover from the “estate” of a Medicaid 
recipient when Medicaid benefits were paid on behalf of the decedent 
after he or she turned fifty-five.119  This right of recovery normally 
arises at death against any property in which the Medicaid recipient 
had an interest at the moment of death.120  However, as I will describe, 
some states have broadened the estate recovery rule to include prop-
erty transferred away prior to death.121 
B. The Recipient’s “Estate” 
Medicaid estate recovery only applies to the “estate” of the Med-
icaid recipient.122  However, the definition of “estate” employed in 
some states is much broader than the typical use of the term.123  Nor-
mally, the term “estate” might be thought to include only property 
owned at death—that is, the probate estate.  However, a federal stat-
ute gives states the latitude to broaden the definition to include non-
probate assets which pass at death.124  That statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(b)(4), provides in pertinent part: 
 
[T]he term “estate”, with respect to a deceased individual—
(A)  shall include all real and personal property and other assets 
included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of 
State probate law; and (B)  may include, at the option of the 
                                                                                                                                
 118. See FLEMING & NACHMIAS, supra note 10, at Q 17:92. The states are re-
quired to attempt recovery against the home.  West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d, 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). 
 121. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 
(Idaho 2012) (discussed infra). 
 122. 20 C.F.R. § 416.570 (2014); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 7.07[F][5]. 
 123. Medicaid Estate Recovery, supra note 19. 
 124. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).   
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State . . . any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets con-
veyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life es-
tate, living trust, or other arrangement.
125
 
 
A reasonable reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) is that the state 
can make recovery against assets in which the recipient had an inter-
est during life to the extent of the interest that passed from the recipi-
ent at death to some other person by means of a will, trust, contract, 
intestacy, or by operation of law.126  However, at least one court has 
interpreted “estate” to include even assets in which the Medicaid re-
cipient had no property interest at death if the recipient had an inter-
est in the asset at some earlier point and transferred it away gratui-
tously.127  That case, Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare v. McCormick,128 
arose from bad, yet not unusual, facts and, as will be discussed, cre-
ates particular pressure for the use of divorce as a mechanism for 
avoiding estate recovery.  But, before discussing McCormick, it will be 
useful to consider how the estate of the recipient’s spouse may also be 
subject to estate recovery. 
C. The Estate of the Recipient’s Spouse 
The application of estate recovery against the estate of the Medi-
caid recipient’s spouse can arise by two distinct paths depending on 
whether the state involved is a common law or a community property 
state.129 
                                                                                                                                
 125. Id. 
 126. This reading of the statute was embraced by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. See In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). 
 127. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790–91 
(Idaho 2012) (“However, the federal statute also expressly allows states to expand 
the definition of ‘estate’ beyond the ‘real and personal property and other assets’ 
in the individual’s own estate to also include ‘any other real and personal proper-
ty and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death.’”). 
 128. McCormick has been followed in Idaho by another decision that again 
upheld estate recovery against the estate of the community spouse.  See Idaho v. 
Wiggins, 306 P.3d 201 (Idaho 2013). 
 129. Begley & Jeffreys argue that estate recovery against the estates of com-
munity spouses was never intended under federal law but accept that it is occur-
ring.  See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.08[A]. 
MILLER.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2015  2:51 PM 
NUMBER 1           MEDICAID, ESTATE RECOVERY, AND DIVORCE  59 
In common law states, the surviving spouse has the right to elect 
against the will of the decedent spouse.130  If the decedent spouse dies 
intestate, the surviving spouse is also entitled to a share.131  Thus, in 
common law states, the surviving spouse nearly always has some 
claim against the estate of the predeceasing spouse.132  If the surviving 
spouse is a Medicaid recipient, some states apply estate recovery to 
the survivor’s claim against the decedent spouse’s estate.133  In these 
states, the state Medicaid agency may force the election by the surviv-
ing spouse. 
In community property states, each spouse is deemed to own one 
half of the community property, and, with limited exceptions, there is 
no right to elect against the will.134  However, the first spouse to die 
has no right to deprive the surviving spouse of his or her share of the 
community property.  In other words, the decedent’s will cannot dis-
pose of the surviving spouse’s share of the community property with-
out his or her consent.  Moreover, in a community property state if a 
spouse dies intestate, the decedent’s half of the community property 
usually passes to the surviving spouse.135  In that case, creditors of the 
survivor can pursue the survivor’s interest acquired by intestate suc-
cession.136  Even if the decedent spouse dies with a will, the creditors 
                                                                                                                                
 130. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-202(a) (2013). (“The surviving spouse of a decedent 
who dies domiciled in this state has a right of election . . . to take an elective-share 
amount equal to 50 percent of the value of the marital property portion of the 
augmented estate.”) 
 131. Id.  
 132. See, e.g., id.; In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. 2008). 
 133. Cynthia L. Barrett, Disclaimer and Elective Share in the Medicaid Context, 1 
MARQ. ELDER ADVISOR 40, 43–45 (2000).  See, e.g., In re Estate of Shipman, 832 
N.W.2d 335 (S.D. 2013); See Tannler v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., 
564 N.W.2d 735 (Wis. 1997).  For an interesting variation on this theme see Estate 
of Demartino v. Div. Med. Assistance Health Serv., 861 A.2d 138 (N.J. 2011).  For 
more discussion see also Julia Belian, Medicaid, Elective Shares, and the Ghosts of Ten-
ures Past, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1111, 1133 (2005).  
 134. What constitutes community property may vary somewhat from state to 
state. But, in general, it is the earned income of a married couple and the property 
acquired with that income while domiciled in a community property state.  See, 
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (2015).  In some community property states, income 
from separate property is community property. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32–906 
(2015). See, e.g., I.G. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 900 A.2d 840 (2006); Miller v. Kan-
sas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 275 Kans. 349 (2003); BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra 
note 10, at § 7.06[E][3].  
 135. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2–102A(b) (2013). 
 136. Id. 
MILLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2015  2:51 PM 
60 The Elder Law Journal VOLUME 23 
of the surviving spouse have a claim against all of the community 
property of the two spouses.137  Under this logic, estate recovery may 
be had against the estate of the community spouse for Medicaid bene-
fits paid on behalf of the institutional spouse.  An important differ-
ence to note between common law states and community property 
states is that, normally, in a community property state, one would not 
expect estate recovery to apply to the community spouse’s estate 
where there is no community property and no bequest to or inher-
itance by the institutional spouse.138 
This brings us back to McCormick which involved the estate of 
George Perry.139  Mr. Perry and his wife, Martha Perry, resided in Ida-
ho, a community property state.140 Their home originally was Martha’s 
separate property, which she subsequently converted to community 
property.141  A few years later, she executed a durable power of attor-
ney appointing George as her agent.142  A few months later, George 
used the durable power to quit claim Martha’s interest in the home to 
himself.143  About that same time, Martha qualified for Medicaid assis-
tance.144  Less than three years later, George predeceased Martha.145  
She then died a little more than a year after George’s passing.146  The 
only significant asset in George’s estate was the home, which was 
formerly owned by Martha, and now worth about $80,000.147  Idaho’s 
Medicaid agency filed a claim against his estate for the more than 
$100,000 in Medicaid benefits it had bestowed upon Martha.148 
One can readily see the equity in the state’s claim. The only ma-
jor asset in George’s estate was the home that originally belonged to 
                                                                                                                                
 137. For a discussion of this principle as applied in California see CHARLOTTE 
K. GOLDBERG, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 
225–26 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2010). 
 138. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transistion, 59 MO. L. 
REV. 21, 27 (1994) (discussing the default rules followed when allocating property 
in community property and separate property states). 
 139. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho 
2012).  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 786. 
 148. Id. at 786–87. 
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Martha.149  Upon George’s death, one could argue that it represented 
good policy to have the home used to help pay for Martha’s medical 
bills.150  But, George’s estate consisted of no community property.151  
Thus, under general principles of Idaho law, Martha’s creditor, the 
Idaho Medicaid agency, should have had no allowable claim against 
the home.  Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the agency’s 
claim.152  It did so relying on a complex web of federal and state Medi-
caid statutes and regulations that we will not seek to fully recapitulate 
here.153  However, the portion of the court’s analysis of the applicable 
federal statutes is worth reviewing since it represents a major depar-
ture from most prior interpretations by other state courts.154  It may 
represent the direction that estate recovery will take in the future if, as 
it seems likely, pressure grows for more draconian treatment of Medi-
caid recipients and their families.155 
In McCormick, the Idaho Supreme Court focused on two of the 
federal statutes.156  The first statute defines the scope of estate recovery 
and the second defines the word “assets” as it is used in Medicaid 
law.157  Let us take them one at a time. 
Recall that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p allows estate recovery against the 
“estate” of the Medicaid recipient and also against: 
 
 “. . . any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets con-
veyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
                                                                                                                                
 149. Id. 
 150. Medicaid does not seek to levy against the home while the community 
spouse is living in it, even when the home is owned solely by the institutional 
spouse.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 151. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 795. 
 152. Id. at 785–86. 
 153. The end of the Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis was to uphold a state reg-
ulation that authorized estate recovery against any asset that had ever been com-
munity property, even where the institutional spouse had no present interest in 
the property at the time of her death.  
 154. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 792. 
 155. This assumes no interference at the federal level.  This appears to be a safe 
assumption since the federal government already seems to be turning a blind eye 
to state actions that arguably contravene federal policy.  See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, 
supra note 10 at § 9.04[B][5]. 
 156. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 790. 
 157. Id. at 791. 
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through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life es-
tate, living trust, or other arrangement.”
158
 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded from this language that the 
state Medicaid agency could lay claim to assets in which the deceased 
Medicaid recipient had no interest at death.159  It arrived at this conclu-
sion by assuming that the language “life estate or living trust” could 
refer to circumstances in which the decedent had conveyed away all 
interest in the asset prior to death.160   
This analysis fails to appreciate how life estates and living trusts 
are normally used in the estate planning environment.  Transfer of a 
remainder while retaining a life estate is a common device in estate 
planning.161  The range of tools to accomplish this is large and can ex-
tend from outright transfer of the remainder in fee to the use of vari-
ous trusts, including living trusts.  A typical living trust is a will sub-
stitute involving transfer of assets to an inter vivos revocable trust for 
the benefit of the grantor.162  These are widely used for disability plan-
ning and for probate avoidance.163  Only at the grantor’s death do such 
trusts benefit third parties.164  If the grantors are a married couple, the 
trust typically continues until the death of both grantors, upon which 
the trust is then distributed to the children or other beneficiaries.165  In 
such circumstances, the transfer of beneficial ownership occurs at the 
death of the grantor just like the other arrangements referred to in the 
statute.166 
                                                                                                                                
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012). 
 159. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 793. 
 160. Id. at 792.  The Court declined to follow the reasoning of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in In Re Estate of Barg where the court applied the doctrine of 
ejusdum generis to find that the phrase must refer to conveyances of interests that 
occur at death. See In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 70 (Minn. 2008). 
 161. See, e.g., RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 
§§ 4.05, 8.07 (Wolters Kluwer 2014).  Many of these tools have a significant estate 
tax planning purpose that is not relevant in the Medicaid context.  See John A. Mil-
ler & Jeffrey A Maine, Wealth Transfer Tax Planning for 2013 and Beyond, 2013 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 879, 880 (2013). 
 162. See, e.g., WAYNE M. GAZUR & ROBERT M. PHILLIPS, ESTATE PLANNING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS, 398–99 (3d ed. 2012); RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., supra note 
161. 
 163. Do I Need a Living Trust?, THE STATE BAR OF CA. (2011), http:// 
www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7xX4AesY230%3d&tabid=1341. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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Certainly the phrase “life estate or living trust” can describe 
many other arrangements concluded during life.  However, a sensible 
application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis167 leads to an understand-
ing that the “life estates, living trusts and other arrangements” re-
ferred to are ones where beneficial enjoyment passes to another upon 
the death of the original owner.168  In short, contrary to the Idaho Su-
preme Court’s decision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, fairly interpreted, does not 
lend itself to the conclusion that estate recovery can be had against 
property in which the decedent had no interest at the moment prior to 
death. 
The Idaho Supreme Court’s second important bit of statutory 
construction involved the definition of “assets” found in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(h)(1). That definition includes income and resources of both 
the community spouse as well as those of the institutional spouse.169  
The definition of “assets” found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) overrules 
state marital property law in both common law and community prop-
erty states, forcing spend down of the community spouse’s property 
to pay for the nursing home costs of the institutional spouse.170  The 
Idaho Supreme Court argued that the broad definition of assets in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) includes property of the community spouse, and 
therefore supports estate recovery against that spouse’s estate even 
when the institutional spouse has no claim to those assets under state 
law.171  This bootstrap reasoning leads to the state having two bites out 
of the same apple.  That is, the state can force spend down of both 
spouses’ assets during life and then lay claim to the remaining assets 
of the community spouse upon his or her death.172 
                                                                                                                                
 167. “A cannon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase 
follows a list of specifics , the general word or phrase will be interpreted to in-
clude only items of the same class as those listed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 
(9th ed. 2009).  See also NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (7th ed. 2007). 
 168. In fairness we might say that the statute is not well drawn to achieve clar-
ity.  The last phrase might have been written to read “[retained] life estates, living 
trusts and other [similar] arrangements.”(bracketed words added). 
 169. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 794 (Idaho 
2012). 
 170. Recall that resources of both spouses are considered for the Medicaid’s 
means testing, subject to the spousal income and resource allowance rules.  See 
supra part II.A.4. 
 171. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 792–93. 
 172. The Idaho rule does, however limit estate recovery against the communi-
ty spouse’s estate to property that had some community property history.  Id.  
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Though we may question the reasoning employed in McCormick, 
our main concern is to consider where this sort of court-made law is 
taking Medicaid recipients and their spouses. It seems to argue for in-
creased use of divorce as a Medicaid planning mechanism, at least in 
cases with more typical facts than McCormick.173  That idea will be ex-
plored more fully after the paper addresses a few other aspects of the 
mechanics of estate recovery. 
D. A Life Estate and Other Transitory Interests Owned by the Re-
cipient 
In some states, estate recovery can be had against the actuarial 
value of a life estate owned by the recipient determined on the date of 
death disregarding the fact of death.174  In other words, life estate in-
terests are valued as of the moment immediately prior to death.175  
From a common sense standpoint, this seems unfair since the de-
ceased person’s estate has no ownership interest in the property.  
However, there is a certain logic to this approach when the remainder 
was transferred gratuitously by the Medicaid recipient outside of the 
look-back period.176  In those cases, the transferor may be seen as hav-
ing employed the transfer as a device to avoid the transfer penalty 
while retaining the enjoyment of the asset during life.  Inclusion of the 
actuarial value of the retained life estate simply dampens the efficacy 
of this planning strategy.  The rule makes less sense in those cases 
where the Medicaid recipient is the beneficiary of a life estate created 
by a third party. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 173. I am thinking here of the case where the home was always community 
property and thus would likely be divided 50-50 in a divorce.  Following divorce 
in such a case, I doubt even the Idaho Supreme Court would argue that the entire 
home was subject to estate recovery.  In McCormick, recall that the home was orig-
inally the separate property of Martha, the Medicaid recipient spouse.  Had 
George sought a divorce, the divorce court might have awarded the entire home 
to Martha thus leaving it subject to estate recovery. 
 174. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10 at § 9.04[B][4].  See, e.g., State v. 
Willingham, 136 P.3d 66 (Ore. Ct. App. 2006). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Those persons familiar with the federal estate tax will recognize some 
similarity to 26 U.S.C. § 2036 (2012).  Indeed Section 2036 is even more draconian 
since it draws the entire remainder interest back into the gross estate.  Id. 
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E. The Deferral Rule 
Estate recovery will be deferred until the death of the community 
spouse.177  Further, the state will release the lien described below if the 
surviving spouse wishes to sell the property because the state cannot 
recover anything prior to the death of the surviving spouse.178  In some 
states, the right to recover does not apply to the property in the name 
of the community spouse, or the portion of the property owned by the 
community spouse if the property is jointly owned.179  In most states, if 
the couple leaves any assets in the name of the institutional spouse, 
including title to the home, there could be a Medicaid lien against the 
institutional spouse’s share of the property.180 
F. The Undue Hardship Rule 
Medicaid recovery may be waived where it will cause an “undue 
hardship.”181  If a Medicaid recipient is survived by a registered do-
mestic partner, some states will recognize an undue hardship and de-
fer recovery as it would in the case where a spouse survived the Med-
icaid recipient.182 
G. Estate Recovery Liens 
Federal law allows the states to place liens on the property of 
Medicaid recipients in various circumstances.183  Usually, Medicaid’s 
right to file a lien only arises at the death of the Medicaid recipient.184 
However, some states permit an earlier filing.185  If the property is 
sold, Medicaid will be entitled to a share of the proceeds, even if the 
Medicaid recipient is still living.186  In some states, the state can cause a 
notice of encumbrance to be recorded in the chain of title of any real 
                                                                                                                                
 177. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.03; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (2012).  
Further deferral can occur if the couple who died was survived by a minor or dis-
abled child.  Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B][1], 9.04[B][2], 9.08[B]. 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
 181. U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3).  See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.05[A]; 
DAYTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 29:118. 
 182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(3)(A), 1396p(c)(2)(D), 1396p(d)(5). 
 183. Id. at § 1396p(a)(1).  See DAYTON ET AL., supra note 10, at § 29:113. 
 184. Bleck et al., supra note 9. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 30. 
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property interest held by a Medicaid recipient.187  The transition from a 
Medicaid claim to a Medicaid lien depends on state law.188 
IV. Planning Techniques to Avoid Spend Down and  
       Estate Recovery 
Based on the foregoing background and discussion we can now 
set out various planning options to avoid or minimize estate recovery. 
A. An Overview of Medicaid Planning Techniques and Their  
Relation to Estate Recovery 
In our earlier work on this topic, my co-authors and I described 
many Medicaid planning strategies.189  These include gifts beyond the 
five-year look-back period, disinheritance of the institutionalized per-
son; the use of special needs trusts for the institutional spouse; annu-
itization of retirement accounts and savings (often for the benefit of 
the community spouse); spend down on the home or other exempt as-
sets (called asset repositioning); caregiver agreements with family 
members; certain transfers of the home to a spouse, child or sibling; 
use of exempt assets (i.e., the home) to pay for the nursing home dur-
ing a penalty period arising from gratuitous transfers; and, finally, di-
vorce or marriage avoidance.190 
Some of these are only designed to obtain Medicaid eligibility 
while preserving wealth during the recipient’s lifetime.  Others, most 
prominently gifts and annuities, are designed to avoid estate recovery 
as well.  The liberal income rules and the restrictive resource rules 
make the purchase of an annuity for the community spouse with ex-
cess resources an important planning tool for middle class couples.  
Indeed, the annuity purchase option is the chief planning alternative 
to divorce in many cases.191  But, annuitization has its limitations as a 
planning tool.  First, it does not work to protect the home since, nor-
mally, the community spouse will want to continue to live there.192  
                                                                                                                                
 187. DAYTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 29:113. 
 188. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at § 9.10[A]. 
 189. Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 188–96. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See generally id. (discussing the benefits of annuitization and divorce to 
avoid transfer penalties). 
 192. Indeed, both spouses may continue to reside there in states that support 
Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) through Medicaid. 
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Additionally, there are at least two other problems that can make an-
nuitization less appealing.  One problem is, it may force the sale of 
appreciated assets and the sale of assets that are preferred to be kept 
in the family.193  Another is that, it creates risk of loss due to premature 
death.194  As discussed earlier, the single asset most at risk of estate re-
covery is the home.195  But, recall that in some states estate recovery 
can also be had against other property as well.196  In the next section, I 
focus on whether, and to what extent, planning can avoid estate re-
covery with respect to homes, life estates of the institutional spouse, 
the institutional spouse’s elective share of the community spouse’s es-
tate, and property in which the institutional spouse once held a com-
munity property interest.  What we see is that for married couples, di-
vorce cuts most cleanly through all of the bureaucratic Gordian knots. 
B. Estate Recovery Planning with Respect to the Home 
As I noted at the outset, the Medicaid recipient’s home is the 
most common asset subject to estate recovery.  There are, however, a 
number of lawful methods for avoiding estate recovery with respect 
to part or all of the value represented by the home. 
1. TRANSFER THE HOME AND PAY THE PENALTY 
For a single person with a home of substantial value, it may be 
advantageous to gift a partial interest in the person’s home after quali-
fying for Medicaid.  For this approach to work, it is necessary to main-
tain enough funds to fully cover long-term care during any penalty 
period arising from the transfer. 
 
EXAMPLE: Effective Gifting of a Partial Interest in the Home 
Mary, a single person already receiving Medicaid LTC services 
owns an exempt house worth $400,000. Mary then gifts a 50% in-
terest in the house and reports the gift to the state Medicaid agen-
                                                                                                                                
 193. See Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 174–75 (discussing how annuities can be 
consider “gifts” and how the state will attempt to recover the value of gifts if a 
person is unable to pay for nursing home care). 
 194. See id. at 174 ("The purchase of an annuity will be treated as a gift unless it 
is irrevocable, non-assignable, pays out in equal periodic payments, and it is equal 
to or less than the life-expectancy of the annuitant.”). 
 195. See id. at 162-63 (discussing the limits of exempt home equity). 
 196. See, e.g., Estate Recovery, INDIANA FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., 
http://www.in.gov/fssa/OMPP/4874.htm. 
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cy.  Medicaid coverage would be terminated for X months begin-
ning with the month after the month of the gift.  The house is then 
sold, and 50% of the sales proceeds to which Mary is entitled is 
used to pay for care during the X month period of ineligibility. 
2. TRANSFER THE HOME TO CERTAIN CHILDREN OR SIBLINGS 
It is always important to determine whether a penalty-free trans-
fer of the home may be made.  Such transfers are transfers to a child 
who has lived in the home and cared for the applicant for the two-
year period immediately prior to institutionalization, or transfers to a 
sibling who has lived in the home for one year and has an equity in-
terest in the home, or transfers to a disabled child.197 
3. ESTABLISH TRUSTS FOR DISABLED PERSONS LESS THAN SIXTY-
FIVE OR FOR A DISABLED CHILD OF ANY AGE 
As discussed above, there is no penalty for transfers to trusts for 
the sole benefit of disabled children of the Medicaid applicant or for 
the sole benefit of any disabled person under sixty-five.198  Thus, trans-
fer of exempt property, such as the home, in those circumstances will 
avoid estate recovery. 
4. TRANSFERS OF REMAINDER INTERESTS IN THE HOME OUTSIDE 
OF LOOK-BACK 
A planning technique for avoiding estate recovery is to transfer a 
remainder interest in the home to a loved one outside of the look-back 
period.199  The retained interest can be a life estate or a term of years, 
but a life estate may not completely avoid estate recovery because of 
the peculiar rules concerning life estates that some states have adopt-
ed.200  A typical Qualified Personal Residence Trust (“QPRT”) might 
well do the job.201  In many states, married couples may not need this 
technique since transfers from one spouse to another are exempt from 
the transfer penalty rules.202  Instead, they will likely employ the tech-
niques described below.  However, the great limitation of the remain-
                                                                                                                                
 197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(a)(2), 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iv) (2014).  See supra Part IV.D. See 
also Gilfix, supra note 58, at 31. 
 198. See supra Part IV.D. 
 199. See Gilfix, supra note 58, 31–32. 
 200. For an illustration of the problem, see State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. 
v. Willingham, 136 P.3d 66, 69–70 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
 201. For a discussion of QPRTs, see Miller & Maine, supra note 161, at 945. 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (2014).  
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der transfer strategy is that it requires considerable advance planning 
on the part of the homeowner since it must occur more than five years 
before any Medicaid application is filed.203  Of course, it also involves 
parting with property that might otherwise be kept for the community 
spouse’s future benefit. 
5. TRANSFER OF THE HOME FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL SPOUSE TO 
THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE 
With respect to the community spouse, there is a one-time only 
“snapshot” of community resources taken at the time of the institu-
tional spouse’s initial eligibility.204  Generally speaking, after the snap-
shot, increases or changes to the form of the community spouse’s 
wealth, and uncompensated transfers made by the community 
spouse, are disregarded.205  For this reason, transferring title of the 
home solely into the community spouse’s name may prevent the nurs-
ing home spouse from becoming ineligible in the event the home is 
sold, as well as protect the home from Medicaid estate recovery in 
some cases.206  This area of opportunity may be closing as states ramp 
up their estate recovery efforts.  There is no federal law barrier to the 
states closing this opportunity. 
6. REVISE THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE’S ESTATE PLAN 
The community spouse should consider revising his or her estate 
plan to take into account the possibility that he or she may die before 
the spouse on Medicaid.  This is because an inheritance by the nursing 
home spouse could cause ineligibility or subject the inherited re-
sources to estate recovery.207  Through a new will, the community 
spouse could leave the estate to a special needs trust for the institu-
tional spouse or directly to children.  In many states, the death of the 
community spouse would not cause the disqualification of an institu-
                                                                                                                                
 203. FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 132–33.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
s(c)(1)(B). 
 204. FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 132–33. 
 205. Id. In this context, it is important to recall that the resource test for Medi-
caid eligibility combines the assets of both spouses without regard to title.  Thus, 
transfers between spouses are irrelevant in the initial determination of eligibility. 
Id. 
 206. See Michael J. Millonig, Post-Eligibility Transfers, 3 NAELA J. 33 (2007).  
Recall, however, the discussion of the McCormick decision in Part III.C. 
 207. Millonig, supra note 206, at 34. 
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tional spouse and the assets would not be subject to Medicaid estate 
recovery upon the death of the institutional spouse.208  However, a 
special needs trust created through a revocable living trust would be 
subject to the look-back rules and, thus, would result in the disqualifi-
cation of the institutional spouse.209 
7. DIVORCE, LEGAL SEPARATION, OR NON-BINDING UNIONS 
Finally, we come to divorce as the emerging planning tool of 
choice.  When a married couple has at least moderate wealth, the asset 
spend down requirements for Medicaid eligibility are painful to meet 
and the prospect of estate recovery sweeping up what is left is a seri-
ous concern.  In such circumstances, divorce can serve as a planning 
option to protect the community spouse and to preserve resources to 
meet the special needs of the institutional spouse.  Divorce is also a 
possible mechanism to preserve resources for loved ones.  This is be-
cause, after a divorce, the assets allocated in the dissolution decree to 
the non-applying ex-spouse are not countable resources for the Medi-
caid applicant and are not subject to estate recovery.210  An order allo-
cating assets to a community spouse pursuant to a decree of legal sep-
aration appears to be as effective for this purpose as a divorce 
decree.211  In many divorces, it will be necessary to appoint a guardian 
ad litem to represent the nursing home spouse and it may not be pos-
sible to convince a court to allocate disproportionate resources to the 
community spouse.  Even an equal division may be beneficial to the 
community spouse where there is a substantial amount of countable 
assets.  For example, if the couple has $500,000 in countable assets, an 
                                                                                                                                
 208. See Moore & Landsman, supra note 10, at A-91. This may not be true in all 
states.  Id.  See discussion in the preceding section of Idaho Dept. of Health & Wel-
fare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho 2012). In that case, the institutional 
spouse had converted her separate property (her home) into community property 
a few years prior to entering a nursing home.  Id. at 786.  Later, the community 
spouse exercised a durable power of attorney to quitclaim the institutional 
spouse’s interest to himself.  Id.  The community spouse predeceased the institu-
tional spouse and that led the state to seek recover Medicaid benefits paid to the 
institutional spouse from the estate of the community spouse.  Id.  The Idaho Su-
preme Court held that federal law did not preempt Idaho state law permitting 
such a recovery.  Id. at 795. 
 209. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 89, at 135–37. 
 210. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2014); see generally 14.05 PLANNING 
STRATEGIES FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED, 2001 WL 1585266, 19. 
 211. Id.  
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equal division would leave the community spouse with $250,000 ra-
ther than the maximum community spouse resource allowance of 
$117,400.  It is worth noting that divorce does not mean that the cou-
ple must live apart.  Nor does it mean that the community spouse 
cannot continue to provide care and certain types of support to the in-
stitutional spouse. 
Many couples may find the idea of using divorce for Medicaid 
planning too repugnant to consider.  In some cases, other approaches 
may be beneficial.  For example, a married couple with substantial 
countable assets might upgrade their home or purchase a new car as 
discussed above212 and then later transfer any interest the institutional 
spouse might have in the asset to the community spouse in order to 
avoid estate recovery.  But, this approach will not work in all states.213 
For moderately well-to-do couples that form late in life it might 
be prudent to avoid marriage or to marry in a form that does not con-
stitute a legally cognizable union.  In this way, neither partner’s assets 
become subject to spend down or the potential application of estate 
recovery if the other partner should require protracted long-term care. 
C. Scenarios Where Divorce Is a Rational Strategy 
There are many scenarios where divorce might make sense.  In 
general, we can say that the underlying circumstances for considering 
divorce include: 
 
1. The community spouse is reasonably healthy and/or the 
           motivation to provide an inheritance to someone other than 
           the institutional spouse is high; 
2. There is a significant amount of wealth and income legally 
           allocable to the community spouse; 
3. The life expectancy of the institutional spouse is sufficiently  
           great to create the likelihood of large uninsured long-term  
           care costs; 
                                                                                                                                
 212. The essence of this technique, the reader should recall, is to turn a count-
able asset into an exempt asset. 
 213. 14.05 PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED, 2001 WL 
1585266, 19.  
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4. And, there are insufficient countervailing circumstances 
           such as adverse pension or Social Security consequences.214 
 
As a caveat I might add that I assume here that the divorce and 
attendant property division would be honored by the state Medicaid 
authorities.  I can, however, imagine such authorities attacking the di-
vorce or the property division as sham transactions. It is not my pur-
pose to advocate inappropriate divisions of property between the 
spouses upon divorce.  In my analysis, I assume a lawful divorce and 
that state law generally will allocate the assets equally between the 
spouses unless it is established that one spouse has a separate proper-
ty interest such as in the case of inherited property that was never 
commingled.  I also assume that Medicaid planning is a rational re-
sponse to a complex and expensive health care system.  There are cer-
tainly moral concerns associated with this sort of planning, but I leave 
those for others to debate and for clients to decide.215 
Set out below are some examples of when divorce might make 
sense.  The examples focus on moderately well-to-do middle class 
couples.  They are relevant to persons of greater or lesser means as 
well. 
Scenario 1: The Better off Community Spouse in a Second Marriage 
The paradigm case for divorce is when the marriage is relatively 
new, there is a prenuptial agreement216 and the community spouse is 
well off in her own right. 
Example: Alonzo, age seventy-five and Barbara, age seventy, a 
married couple, have no children in common.  Barbara has three chil-
dren from a prior marriage.  They married five years ago and live in 
Barbara’s condominium in a retirement community.  They have a 
standard premarital agreement providing that each has no claim on 
the property or income of the other.  Barbara brought $600,000 in net 
assets to the marriage in addition to the condominium.  She has pen-
                                                                                                                                
 214. Id. at 15. 
 215. In an earlier article I considered this dimension of Medicaid planning.  See 
Miller, supra note 1, at 98–101.   
 216. It is useful to recall that Medicaid accords no consequences to the exist-
ence of a prenuptial agreement for purposes of the resource test.  Thus, aside from 
the Community Spouse Resource Allowance, the community spouse’s assets re-
main subject to spend down. See infra Part II.A.4(b). 
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sion income and Social Security amounting to $4,000 a month.  Alonzo 
brought $100,000 of net assets to the marriage and has Social Security 
and pension income of $2,000 per month.  Alonzo has mid-stage Par-
kinson’s disease but is in otherwise good health and could live for 
many years.  As his Parkinson’s becomes more severe, the costs for his 
long-term care will exceed $100,000 annually.  By divorcing, Alonzo 
and Barbara could save any part of her assets from Medicaid spend 
down and save her home from any claim for Medicaid estate recov-
ery.  This preserves her quality of life and makes it probable that she 
will die with sufficient assets to assure her children of an inheritance.  
Barbara and Alonzo can continue to live together at least until he is 
obliged to enter a care facility.  Barbara can make certain gifts to 
Alonzo and even establish a special needs trust (SNT) for his benefit 
without adversely affecting his ability to qualify for Medicaid assis-
tance.  The remainder of the SNT can pass to her children without be-
ing subject to estate recovery. 
Scenario 2: The Community Spouse in a First Marriage with Separate 
Property 
Even in a longstanding first marriage, it might be advantageous 
to consider divorcing if the community spouse has significant sepa-
rate property. 
Example: Callie, age seventy-eight and John, age seventy-nine, a 
married couple, have two adult children in common and have always 
lived in a community property state.  They married fifty years ago. 
Five years ago John inherited $600,000 from his aunt.  They used 
$200,000 of those assets along with the proceeds from the sale of their 
former home to buy a much nicer home worth $500,000 titled as 
community property in both their names.  State law might treat the 
home purchase as a gift of $100,000 by John to Callie.  John has re-
tained the remaining $400,000 of his inheritance as his separate prop-
erty under their state’s laws.  The combined net worth of their other 
assets is $300,000.  Callie has pension income and Social Security 
amounting to $2,000 a month.  John also has Social Security and pen-
sion income of $2,000 per month.  Callie has been diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease but is in otherwise good health and could live for 
many years.  As her Alzheimer’s disease becomes more severe, the 
costs for her long-term care will exceed $150,000 annually.  By divorc-
ing Callie, John could save $400,000 of his inheritance, save his half of 
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their non-exempt community property from spend down,217  and save 
his half of the home from any claim for estate recovery.  This pre-
serves his quality of life and makes it probable that he will die with 
sufficient assets to assure their children of an inheritance.  Callie and 
John can continue to live together at least until she is obliged to enter 
a memory care facility. In some states, the home would need to be 
sold in order to fully insulate John’s half of the equity from estate re-
covery.  After the divorce, John can make certain gifts to Callie and 
even establish a special needs trust for her benefit without adversely 
affecting her ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance.  The remainder 
interest in the trust could pass to their children without being subject 
to estate recovery. 
Scenario 3: The Well-Housed Couple of Moderate Means 
Even couples with modest amounts of income and exempt assets 
in long-time marriages might find divorce a plausible strategy if the 
couple has an expensive home in a state, such as Idaho or Colorado, 
that aggressively pursues marital property through estate recovery.218 
Example: Greta, age seventy-five, and Hal, age seventy-seven, 
are a married couple with three adult children in common and have 
always lived in a community property state.  They married fifty years 
ago and live in a large home worth $700,000.  The home is community 
property under their state’s law. They have other marital assets worth 
$300,000.  Greta has pension income and Social Security amounting to 
$2,000 a month.  Hal also has Social Security and pension income of 
$2,000 per month.  Greta has been diagnosed with vascular dementia, 
but, is in otherwise good health and could live for many years.  As her 
dementia becomes more severe, the costs for her long-term care will 
exceed $150,000 annually.  By divorcing with an equal property divi-
sion, Hal could save $150,000 of their net assets from spend down, 
and save his half of the home from any claim for estate recovery.  This 
preserves his quality of life and makes it probable that he will die with 
sufficient assets to assure their children of an inheritance.  Greta and 
Hal can continue to live together at least until she is obliged to enter a 
memory care facility. In some states, the home would need to be sold 
                                                                                                                                
 217. Id. Of course, he could keep about $119,000 of their net assets anyway as 
his Community Spouse Resource Allowance. Id. 
 218.  See infra Part III. C. See BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B] & 
9.08. 
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in order to fully insulate Hal’s half of the equity from estate recovery.  
In many states, however, the couple might retain the home until they 
are both deceased and estate recovery would only apply to Greta’s 
half.  After the divorce, Hal can make certain gifts to Greta and even 
establish a special needs trust for her benefit without adversely affect-
ing her ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance.  The remainder in-
terest in the trust could pass to their children without being subject to 
estate recovery. 
It is worth noting that there are other options that have signifi-
cant appeal.  They could gift a remainder interest in the home to their 
children and hope to outlast the look-back period before applying for 
Medicaid.  Or they could sell the home and move to less valuable 
housing and use the excess funds to purchase an annuity for Hal’s 
benefit. 
Scenario 4: The Well-Off Couple in a Longtime Marriage with Children 
Divorce is at least a plausible strategy if a long-time married 
couple is well off enough to have much to protect, but not so rich that 
long-term care costs can be shrugged off. 
Example: Dharma, age sixty-eight and Edward, age seventy-one, 
are a married couple with two adult children in common and have 
always lived in a common law state.  They married fifty years ago and 
live in a large home worth $1,000,000. They have other marital assets 
worth $1,000,000.  Dharma has pension income and Social Security 
amounting to $4,000 a month.  Edward also has Social Security and 
pension income of $4,000 per month.  Dharma has been diagnosed 
with Alzheimer’s disease but is in otherwise good health and could 
live for many years.  As her Alzheimer’s disease becomes more se-
vere, the costs for her long-term care will exceed $150,000 annually.  
By divorcing with an equal property division, Edward could save 
$500,000 of their net assets from spend down, and save his half of the 
home from any claim for estate recovery.  This preserves his quality of 
life and makes it probable that he will die with sufficient assets to as-
sure their children of an inheritance.  Dharma and Edward can con-
tinue to live together at least until she is obliged to enter a memory 
care facility. In some states, the home would need to be sold in order 
to fully insulate Edward’s half of the equity from estate recovery.219  In 
                                                                                                                                
 219.  See infra Part III.C (discussion of McCormick). This is because in those 
states a home with any history as joint tenancy or community property might be 
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many states, however, the couple might retain the home until they are 
both deceased.220  After the divorce, Edward can make certain gifts to 
Dharma and even establish a special needs trust for her benefit with-
out adversely affecting her ability to qualify for Medicaid assistance.  
The remainder interest in the trust could pass to their children with-
out being subject to estate recovery. 
It is worth noting that there are at least two other options that 
have significant appeal.  The first is to annuitize some of their non-
exempt assets for Edward’s benefit.  The second is to make gifts to 
their children right away while retaining enough assets to get past the 
five year look-back period.  The children, in turn, might choose to use 
the assets to fund a special needs trust for the parents while keeping 
the remainder interest for themselves.221 
  
                                                                                                                                
the subject of an estate recovery action even though it is not marital property at 
the time of the former community spouse’s death.  This relates especially to the 
court’s analysis in Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 
(Idaho 2012).  See the discussion supra in Part III.C.  Of course, McCormick did not 
involve divorced spouses and so it is not directly on point.  But the essence of the 
court’s holding in McCormick was to permit estate recovery against property that 
was solely owned by the community spouse because the property had once been 
community property. It is possible that a court could extend this reasoning to 
former marital property now owned by a former spouse of a Medicaid recipi-
ent.  This extreme form of tracing is not presently the norm.  See BEGLEY & 
JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B], 9.08. 
 220.  The home would presumably be retained as tenants in common with nei-
ther former spouse having any choice or right with respect to the other’s half.  
This is because there should normally be no estate recovery against a former 
community spouse’s interest in the home.  Indeed, some states do not pursue es-
tate recovery against the home even if the spouses remain married until death if 
the home has been transferred entirely into the name of the community 
spouse.  See, e.g., 2 California Elder Law Resources, Benefits, and Planning §§ 11.71 
& 83; BEGLEY & JEFFREYS, supra note 10, at §§ 9.04[B], 9.08. 
 221. It is doubtful the gift to the children could be conditioned on their estab-
lishing a SNT for the parents without triggering a challenge from the Medicaid 
authorities. 
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D. Countervailing Financial Factors Concerning Divorce 
There are various financial benefits associated with marriage that 
run counter to seeking divorce even though Medicaid spend down is 
in the offing.  First, if the community spouse has little income, he or 
she may be entitled to a monthly needs allowance taken from the in-
come of the institutional spouse.222  Obviously, that right to such an 
income allocation evaporates upon divorce unless it is awarded in the 
decree. 
Second, if the community spouse outlives the institutional 
spouse, he or she may be entitled to an increased Social Security bene-
fit by stepping into the deceased spouse’s shoes.223  Generally speak-
ing, the surviving spouse is entitled to succeed to the deceased 
spouse’s monthly benefit if it is greater than her or his own monthly 
benefit.  However, this principle also applies to divorced spouses if 
the marriage lasted more than ten years and the claimant did not re-
marry before age sixty.224 
Third, since transfers between spouses are ignored for transfer 
penalty purposes, spending down by purchasing an annuity for the 
benefit of the community spouse does not trigger the penalty.225  If the 
spouses were to divorce followed by institutional spouse spend down 
on an annuity for the ex-community spouse, the transfer penalty 
would apply.226  Thus, when an annuity purchase will suffice, it ren-
ders divorce unnecessary and even counter-productive. 
E. The Problem of Incapacity 
In some cases, where divorce might be a rational strategy, there 
may be some question about the capacity of one spouse or the other to 
engage in such planning.  The question naturally arises whether a 
guardian could bring a suit for divorce on the ward’s behalf.  Authori-
                                                                                                                                
 222. See infra part IV.B.7.b. 
 223. See RALPH C. BRASHIER, MASTERING ELDER LAW, 222–23 (2010).   
 224. Id.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.336 (2015). 
 225. The annuity does have to be structured to satisfy certain requirements.  
See Bleck et al., supra note 9, at 194–95. 
 226. See VALERIE J. BOGART, SELFHELP CMTY. SERVS., INC., FINANCIAL 
ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICAID SPEND-DOWN PROGRAM IN NEW YORK 1, 
16–22 (2010), available at http://www.wnylc.com/health/afile/46/70/. 
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ties are divided on the issue.227  Even where it is permitted, whether 
the guardian should do so is an open question.  Typically we would 
expect the community spouse to initiate the action, thus placing the 
guardian in the role of opposing the divorce or not.  The guardian is 
also faced with the matter of taking a stand on the appropriate proper-
ty division.  In general, we would expect the guardian to assert the 
ward’s right to at least an equal division of marital property.  Of 
course, in all cases, the spouses must have separate representation. 
F. The Problem of Overreaching Children 
On occasion, I hear anecdotally of children or other family mem-
bers seeking to protect their potential inheritances through aggressive 
Medicaid planning for their parents.  In some cases, they may be the 
holders of durable powers of attorney granted by their parents or they 
may even be the guardian of an incapacitated parent. Naturally, the 
attorney must avoid acting in a manner contrary to the best interests 
of the disabled person when the disabled person is the client.228  If the 
client is the guardian, the lawyer must still allow for the guardian’s 
obligations to the ward.229  A lawyer should withdraw from represent-
ing an agent or guardian who intends to act contrary to his or her du-
ties to the principal or ward.230 
V. Is Aggressive Estate Recovery Good Policy? 
The primary policy justification for estate recovery is that it re-
duces the government’s costs of providing services to disabled sen-
iors.231  In 2005, for example, the states recovered over $400,000,000 
from recipients’ estates.232  Estate recovery is consistent with the idea 
                                                                                                                                
 227. See 32 A.L.R. 5th 673 (discussing the power an of incompetent spouse's 
guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment 
of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such a suit). 
 228. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2014). 
 229. See id. at R 8.4 (2014). 
 230. Id. 
 231. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY 
COLLECTIONS 3 (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ 
estreccol.pdf. 
 232. ERICA F. WOOD & ELLEN M. KLEIN, AARP, PROTECTIONS IN MEDICAID 
ESTATE RECOVERY: FINDINGS, PROMISING PRACTICES AND MODEL NOTICES 37 
(2007), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/2007_07_medicaid.pdf. 
MILLER.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2015  2:51 PM 
NUMBER 1           MEDICAID, ESTATE RECOVERY, AND DIVORCE  79 
that Medicaid should only be available to the poor.233  When exempt 
assets are no longer needed by the Medicaid recipient or her spouse, 
why should not the state have a claim for reimbursement?  Moreover, 
estate recovery discourages applying for Medicaid in the first place.234  
Instead, families may keep ailing seniors at home and care for them by 
other means in order preserve their homes for inheritance.  The 
amount of foregone Medicaid claims due to the existence of estate re-
covery is unknown, but is thought to be substantial. 
A counter argument to these points is that estate recovery undu-
ly burdens the poor while failing to significantly reduce governmental 
costs.  Adherents of this view can point to the fact that estate recovery 
brings back into the government coffers less than 1% of its total costs 
of providing long-term care.235  Additionally, the foregone claims in-
duced by the probability of estate recovery may come at the high price 
of leaving disabled seniors in precarious circumstances.  It may also 
place high care giving strains on already stressed families.  The ad-
ministrative burdens of the estate recovery system are also to be con-
sidered.  Moreover, the unevenness of application of estate recovery 
among the states may be seen as unfair.  For example, spousal trans-
fers of the home may avoid estate recovery in one state and not anoth-
er.236  The existence of a life estate in the recipient may trigger estate 
recovery in one state and not in another.237  These striking interstate 
differences in a quasi-federal program are troubling. 
An additional fairness concern is that estate recovery is more eas-
ily avoided or mitigated by the well-advised and the well-off. Should 
a family’s ability to navigate the system be such an important deter-
minant of who benefits from governmental largesse and who does 
not? 
                                                                                                                                
 233. Id. at iv. 
 234. Id. at 27. 
 235. Id. at 38. 
 236. Protecting Your House After You Move Into a Nursing Home, ELDER LAW 
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.elderlawanswers.com/protecting-your-house-
after-you-move-into-a-nursing-home-6897. 
 237. Keith Lyman, How Medicaid Recovers the Cost of Long-Term Care From Your 
Estate After You Die, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-
medicaid-recovers-the-cost-long-term-care-from-your-estate-after-you-die.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
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VI. Medicaid Policy for the Twenty-First Century 
       Should Embrace Disaggregation of Marital Property 
Perhaps the most regrettable aspect of the increased estate recov-
ery efforts of the states is the likelihood that divorce may become a 
more prevalent Medicaid planning tool.  Some practitioners tell me 
the present generation of elderly have been reluctant to employ this 
tool.  Whether the boomers will evince this same reluctance remains to 
be seen.  I doubt it.  As noted at the outset, marriage is becoming de-
institutionalized in America.238 
A governmental aid program that encourages divorce must be 
regarded as questionable in a society that values marriage.  Moreover, 
the penalties that Medicaid imposes on the married are not in step 
with the modern understanding and character of marriage.239  Medi-
caid’s assumption that most of the assets of a married couple should 
be available to pay for the nursing home bills of either spouse is pred-
icated on the idea that a married couple is a single economic unit. This 
idea in turn rests on the mid-twentieth century norm of a long-term 
marriage in which the husband was the primary or sole bread-winner 
and the wife was responsible for child-rearing.  The present era of 
marriage is characterized by dual-working couples, non-marriage for 
many, and  
 
delayed marriage, divorce, remarriage, and changing gender 
roles . . . [T]he content of marriage has become heterogeneous and 
contested. The institution of marriage no longer necessarily im-
plies shared resources, shared expectations, shared children (or 
any children at all), or defined roles in day-to-day life. Childless 
couples, blended families, late-in-life marriages, and two-career 
couples are no longer the exception: They are the new norm.
240
 
 
In this age of heterogeneity and individualism, the fairness of 
imposing the financial burden of one spouse’s long-term disability on 
the other spouse has become doubtful. 
Though a complete disaggregation of marital property for Medi-
caid purposes might be difficult, that is the path we should be tak-
                                                                                                                                
 238. Alstott, supra note 16, at 697. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. (citations omitted). 
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ing.241  In keeping with its general structure of cooperative federalism, 
state property law should control.  In my view Medicaid’s approach 
toward the assets of married couples should mirror its approach to 
their income.  Recall there that Medicaid follows the name on the 
check rule.  Medicaid should accept that the assets of a married couple 
should not be pooled to determine a spouse’s eligibility.  Instead the 
healthy spouse should be able to keep his or her full share of their ag-
gregate assets.  This should be true for estate recovery purposes as 
well as for spend down.  Under this approach, I do not suggest that 
the community spouse resource allowance or the minimum monthly 
needs allowance should disappear completely.  Instead, they should 
be kept in place to provide at least minimal assistance to low net 
worth and low-income community spouses. 
VII. Conclusion 
On balance, the Medicaid system for assisting the married disa-
bled elderly is seriously flawed.  Various plans for reform have been 
proposed and, thus far, rejected.242  This leaves us with Medicaid’s re-
quirement that community spouses must spend down their life sav-
ings for the long-term care of an unhealthy partner before Medicaid 
will help pay for that care.  This approach is increasingly out of step 
with the times.  As a solution, this article proposes the disaggregation 
of marital property for spend down and estate recovery purposes.  
However, the present system seems to favor even greater efforts to re-
strict access to Medicaid.  These efforts include more aggressive estate 
recovery theories.  In some states estate recovery now includes recov-
ery against the estate of the community spouse.  Thus, the pressure on 
the institution of marriage is growing.  Divorce may soon be the ulti-
mate Medicaid planning tool.  Many will consider this a lamentable 
                                                                                                                                
 241. This approach would have something in common with those advocated 
in the income tax and social security contexts that Professor Alstott addresses.  See 
id. at 697 (“My thesis is that the new individualism has rendered obsolete legal 
doctrines and policy analyses that treat formal marriage as the proxy for family 
life.”).  There is a large body of literature on the question of disaggregating the 
income tax.  See, e.g., id.; Anthony C. Infanti, Inequitable Administration: Document-
ing Family for Tax Purposes, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 329 (2011); Lily Kahng, One 
Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTING L.J. 
651 (2010); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral 
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 985 (1993). 
 242. See Miller, supra note 1, at 101–06.  See Wone, supra note 9, at 528.  
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circumstance.  I agree.  In an era in which the institution of marriage is 
already under siege, a statutory regime which encourages divorce is 
unjustified.  Nonetheless, if one thinks of marriage as primarily a con-
tractual arrangement for the mutual convenience of the parties,243  
Medicaid policy impacts the relative benefits and detriments of mar-
riage in a substantial way.  In some circumstances, Medicaid policy 
makes divorce a rational, if unpalatable, response. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 243. Of course there are other ways to look at marriage, and I do not mean to 
disparage them.  In our roles as lawyers, however, we are obliged to consider 
marriage a form of legal partnership with utilitarian advantages and disad-
vantages. 
